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PREFACE
This study was conducted to determine the effects of current legislation on
producers' choices of post-harvest marketing strategies and the resulting levels of risk and
income. At the time most of the work was done, the 1996 farm bill had not been decided.
Near the end of this study, Congress passed the "Federal Agricultural Improvement &
Reform Act". However, work had already been completed on other farm program
proposals, such as a reduced target price proposal. Although this particular proposal was
not adopted, it was included in the results due to the information it contributed concerning
market-based deficiency payments.
The results are not intended to provide marketing strategies for individual
producers, but rather to determine the average effect oflegislative changes on producers'
income and the level of risk that they face. However, information concerning robustness
of certain marketing strategies and general market behavior can be applied in the year-to-
year choice ofa marketing strategy.
Additionally, it should be noted that this study only looked at the intra-year effects
of reducing or eliminating the deficiency payment program. It did not considered the
effects ofyear-to-year variation in prices, and the associated risk in long-term investment
decisions, of reducing or eliminating target prices.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Problem Statement
Government deficiency payments play an important role in determining marketing
strategies for producers who maximize expected utility. The deficiency payment program
is like a subsidized put option with costs coming mainly in the form of acreage reduction
requirements and other compliance restrictions (Gardner; Irwin et a1.).
Since price supports and hedging strategies serve similar purposes, optimal
marketing strategies are influenced by the terms of the government programs. For
example, Turvey and Baker found that for corn and soybean producers, participating in
government programs decreases the use of futures and option contracts. The 1996 farm
bill, entitled "Federal Agricultural Improvement & Reform Act" (FAIR), replaces the
deficiency payment program with market transition payments. These payments are based
on a specified amount of funds divided among the eligible acres signed into the program.
They no longer depend on market prices and do not require set aside acres or planting
restrictions (Sanders and Dicks).
What effect will the transition payments have on wheat producers' optimal, post-
harvest marketing strategies? Specifically, two questions are of interest: First, deficiency
1
payments are intended to help reduce revenue risk to producers~ are marketing strategies
available that can replace the risk-reducing features of deficiency payments? Second, if
producers use those strategies, what will be the overall impact on revenue and risk? Once
these questions are answered, policy makers can use the results to assess the amount by
which producers may be able to offset any additional risk associated with the new
legislation through the use of market-based strategies. Some have suggested that
producers might be able to replace the risk-reduction features of the deficiency payment
program with appropriate futures and options positions.
Commodity futures exchanges can use the results to determine how changes in
farm programs might affect their trading volume. Conventional wisdom suggests that if
the deficiency payment is reduced, use of futures and/or options will increase as producers
attempt to manage the increased risk.
To answer these questions, prices resulting from the different farm program
proposals must be estimated. Then, marketing strategies can be analyzed to predict the
effect of the new payments on revenue and risk.
General Objective
Determine the effect of reducing or eliminating the government deficiency
payments on post-harvest marketing strategies for winter wheat producers.
Specific Obiectives
(1) Determine optimal marketing strategies under current and reduced deficiency
payment scenarios and a no deficiency payment scenario for different levels
of risk aversion.
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(2) Determine the difference in risk adjusted returns ofoptimal strategies under
the alternative policy scenarios.
Literature Review
The purpose of this review is to examine past research outlining different
approaches to optimal marketing strategies, modeling the government deficiency payment
program, and analyzing the effect of the deficiency payment program on marketing
strategies.
Provisions ofMarketing Strategies
Due to the uncertainty of prices, the changing nature ofagricultural markets, and
the availability of many different marketing tools, the choice of a marketing strategy is
complicated. For example, storage, the government deficiency payment program, forward
contracts, futures and options on futures can be used separately or in combination to form
many strategies. Each of these marketing tools can help protect producers from unwanted
price movements or allow them to take advantage of anticipated future price movements
in the market. Although many ofthe marketing tools provide price protection, prevailing
market conditions and individual risk preferences determine which strategy is best.
A hedged position in the futures market (which typically involves selling a futures
contract expiring the month after the anticipated delivery) is one such strategy. It
establishes on the sale date a price equal to the futures price plus the basis on the day the
hedge is offset. Although the risk of decreasing prices is reduced, the ability to take
advantage of increases in prices is forfeited. Problems associated with the use of futures
contracts include: basis risk (unpredictable changes in basis over time), slippage (due to
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the constant movement of the market, reflected in the bid-ask spread), margin
requirements, commission costs, and contract size and delivery dates that don't coincide
with producers' cropSl.
Forward contracts are usually valued by a private purchaser according to an
underlying price of a futures contract. Country elevators offering forward contracts
typically cover purchases by making cash forward sales to processors or other merchants
or by selling futures contracts (Barry, Hopkin, and Baker). The contract price includes
some adjustment (either positive or negative) that takes into account the typical basis of an
area at delivery. Producers who use forward contracts reduce the risk of a decline in
price, but forfeit the gain from increases in price. Although it is similar to using a short
futures position, a forward contract does not require margin money or brokerage fees.
However, expected price may be lower since the provider of the contract will require a
risk premium for bearing the risk (Brorsen, Coombs, and Anderson).
An option allows the purchaser the right but not the obligation to sell or buy the
underlying instrument (i.e futures contract) at a stipulated price (strike price) for a
specified period of time. However, a market-detennined premium must be paid for this
right, reducing the realized price.
If producers expect prices to increase, they can store the commodity to take
advantage ofthe typically higher price occurring later. This strategy is perhaps the riskiest
since storage is costly and prices can actually decline leaving producers vulnerable until
they decide to sell the commodity.
Finally, participation in the government program allows producers to obtain a
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target price if cash prices are low without forfeiting the benefit of an increase in price.
Costs of this program come mainly in the form of acreage reductions but other potential
drawbacks include predetennined yields2, restrictions on crop selection, changing program
guidelines, and possible liquidity problems should a payback be required.
Development of Optimal Marketing Strategy Theory
Since theory attempts to explain the underlying principles of an observed
phenomenon, a fair measure of accuracy would be how well it explains or predicts future
behavior. Typically theories undergo revisions as time goes by and they are tested; current
optimal hedging theory is no exception. Many of the present day models build on
principles suggested by works such as Peck's. She suggested a portfolio approach to
identifying optimal hedge ratios. She argued that hedgers consider both expected returns
and risk in deciding how much of their cash position to cover with futures contracts. The
resulting optimal hedge then is a tradeoff between the iow risk-return resulting from a
hedge and the higher risk-return resulting from not hedging. Thus, the decision of hedging
is influenced by speculative motives as well as risk management objectives. This
contrasted with early works suggesting there is a distinct difference between hedging and
speculating (Keynes). Under this theory hedgers desire to transfer the risk ofholding a
position in the cash commodity to a speculator who is willing to take on the risk for a
premium. Working later proposed that risk reduction or transfer was not the primary
reason for hedging. Although he recognized the risk reduction possibility of hedging, he
claimed that profits from arbitrage are the main reason for hedging.
Johnson later expounded on Working's theory by combining these differing views
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into a theory that explained both the risk-managing and the speculative motives of
hedgers. A hedger who has already established a position in the cash market (e.g. has a
crop growing or in storage) reduces risk by taking opposite positions in the futures
market. The speculative component of the hedge occurs when expected price changes are
taken into account. The optimal hedge ratio is detennined by maximizing risk adjusted
returns where risk is the standard deviation of returns.
Optimal Marketing Strategies
Several studies have calculated optimal hedge ratios under differing assumptions
(Kahl; Lence, Sakong, and Hayes; Cecchetti, Cumby, and Figlewski; Bond and
Thompson; Holthausen; Martinez and Zering; Brorsen).
Use ofHistoric Prices
One approach to this problem has been to identify strategies over previous years
that would have provided consistently high returns. For example, Anderson and Adam
noted that ifperfect price forecasts were available so that producers sold at the highest
price each year, they could have averaged $0.37 per bushel more than selling all wheat at
harvest. Although this type of analysis provides information concerning the past, it is
limited in application since the future is unknown and past occurrences do not necessarily
reoccur. However, strategies identified that consistently performed well can provide
insight into market response and behavior.
Maximizing Expected Returns
Another method used to select marketing strategies is maximizing expected
returns. Anderson, Adam, and Sahs used a current futures price as the best forecast of the
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marketing date price. Based on this forecast, optimal marketing strategies were chosen
that maximize returns. Maximizing expected returns is criticized because it values each
dollar equally and may not weigh the possibilities of outcomes that are lower or higher
than the expected outcome. Since future prices are not known, the variance associated
with the expected price represents risk. These unanticipated changes in price represent the
risk faced by producers and require the modification of profit maximization to account for
the presence of risk.
Minimizing Risk
To incorporate risk into the optimal hedge, models have been constructed with the
objective of minimizing risk. Since ending prices are not known and daily prices are
variable, there is a variance associated with the price distribution. The optimal hedge ratio
is then selected by minimizing the variance of returns. Mathews and Holthausen used this
method while allowing for hedge adjustments to solve for the optimal hedge ratio. They
found that a mean-variance approach works weU in simple hedges (i.e. cross hedging is
not considered) and that in most cases a fixed hedge ratio over the entire hedging period
may be optimal. These results are also consistent with findings of Anderson and Danthine.
This approach does not take into account expected returns and the differing opinions of
individuals towards risk. Typically, more profitable opportunities are also more risky.
Therefore, maximizing expected returns ignores the risk associated with those returns, and
risk minimization (as measured by price deviations) ignores the expected returns.
Maximizing Expected Utility
Current optimal hedging models consider both profit maximization and risk
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aversion (e.g. Pec~ Martinez and Zering~ Adam, Garcia, and Hauser~ Turvey and Baker;
Lence, Sakong, and Hayes). Risk aversion refers to the need to be compensated for
increasing levels of risk. The amount of the compensation required to make an individual
indifferent between a risk-free investment (e.g., a U.S. government bond) and a risky
investment is referred to as a risk premium.
Attitudes toward risk detennine the amount ofcompensation needed by each
investor. To account for typical attitudes toward risk, utility functions have been
developed that exhibit properties unique to individuals with a specific attitude towards
risk. The difference in these models is the effect of the level of wealth on the decision
maker's attitude towards risk. Thus, by maximizing expected utility associated with
different marketing strategies, expected return and risk are both considered, making the
results more realistic.
Deficiency Payment Program
The deficiency payment is a farm program provided by the U. S. government that
places a floor under the price that participating producers receive for a commodity. By
establishing a target price, a payment is made to producers for the amount that the average
U.S. monthly average price is below the target price. Thus, the deficiency payment
program is like a subsidized put option, except that acreage may be restricted and yield
predetennined (Gardner; Irwin et al.). For wheat, a producer must enroll in March to be
eligible for the deficiency payment.
Currently, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates the
marketing year average price and makes an advance payment based on this prediction. A
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prediction is necessary since the marketing year average prioe is based on the monthly
average prices occurring from June ofthe current year to May of the following year. One
approach to predicting the deficiency payment has been to use the expected harvest price
at the time of program sign-up (Anderson, Adam, and Sahs). The predicted deficiency
payment is the difference between the target price and the expected harvest price. This
method only considers the intrinsic value of the "option" and ignores the time value arising
from the possibility that over the course of the marketing year U.S. prices will decrease,
increasing the deficiency payment and making the "option" more valuable.
Kang and Brorsen and Tirupattur and Hauser use an average-option approach to
value the deficiency payment. Since the deficiency payment is based on the difference
between the target price and the marketing year average price (May 30 to June 1 of the
following year), a pricing model is needed that considers the average price of the
underlying asset over a period of time. The average option pricing approach considers
both the intrinsic and time value of the option over a fixed period. Past research using the
Black or Black-Scholes option pricing formulae only considered the time value between
sign-up and harvest, ignoring the time value of the period from harvest to May of the
following year. This time value can be critical especially when prices are near target
levels. Kang and Brorsen suggested that an average option pricing model should also
allow for non-normality and stochastic volatility since prices are neither normally
distributed nor non-stochastic. However, they found only smaIl differences between the
payments predicted using a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
(GARCH) average option pri.cing model and those predicted using a Black average option
9
pricing model. In addition, daily prices were generated for the marketing year in their
study while monthly prices will be generated in this study, making the effect of
heteroskedasticity even less pronounced.
Effects of Government Programs on Optimal Marketing Strategie~
Government farm programs provide producers with price support when market
prices are low. These supports are like option contracts without margin requirements or
maintenance and commissions costs. Since the price supporting effect of these programs
can be recreated using private market tools, costs and effectiveness of the programs can be
analyzed. For example, Ehrich stated, "The loan program has been directly competitive
with futures markets as a mechanism for disposition of seasonal surpluses, since the loan,
at predetermined prices, has been available as a hedge. Of fundamental importance to the
operation of futures markets, then, has been the degree of use of the loan and, conversely,
the amount of wheat available in private trade channels" (pg 314). Under the loan
program, wheat produced on eligible acres could be placed under loan with the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). The producer received a predetermined rate at
harvest and then later could either sell the wheat and pay the loan plus interest or let the
CCC keep the wheat in which case producers were resolved of all responsibility. Not only
did this program reduce hedging by producers, it also reduced export hedging activities
since the government handled most of the production in low price years. AJso, wheat for
milling for export was made available at special prices out of the government CCC stocks,
reducing the use of futures by millers (Ehrich).
The deficiency payment program is like a subsidized put option where the target
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price serves as the strike price of the option (Gardner; Irwin et al.). The government is the
writer of the option and requires payment in the fonn ofacreage reductions and other
compliance restrictions. Although the deficiency payment and a put are similar, there are
important differences. For example the required, yearly set aside acres (the primary cost
of the government program) are determined by the previous year's ending stocks. (In
recent years, stocks have been low, so the set aside requirement has been set at 0%. so
that the cost of the government's "option" has come only in the form of compliance
regulations). Advantages of the deficiency payment program include: advance payments
that contain time value3, no margin requirements or maintenance fees, reduced yield risk4,
no contract size specificationS, and no basis risk. Additionally, Heifner, Glauber, Miranda.
Plato, and Wright note that through provisions of the deficiency payment program the
average price received over a period of years can be increased. This is accomplished by
government programs that reduce quantities reaching consumers or increase consumer
demand (i.e. government food stamps or government export subsidies).
Although there are differences in the tenns of the "options", they derive their
intrinsic value in the same way (see figures I and 2). Government officials hoping to
reduce farm program outlays have attempted to determine if established commodity
markets could provide the benefits of this option with reduced government intervention6
Heifner, Glauber, Miranda, Plato, and Wright found that "Expanded use of futures and
options markets by fanners can partly substitute for price support and deficiency payment
programs in protecting fanner's incomes" (pg. v in the article summary). They suggest
that although intra-year income can be stabilized by using futures, options, or cash
11
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forward contracts, inter-year income stability cannot be attained. This is because futures
markets operate on a short-run horizon making inter-year stability difficult (peck).
Since the deficiency payment and a put option serve similar purposes, optimal
marketing strategies depend on government programs. Turvey and Baker considered the
deficiency payment program and the loan program in their study analyzing marketing
strategies for corn and soybean producers. They found that hedging decreased in the
presence of the loan program for both com and soybean producers, and that none of the
expected corn production was hedged in the presence of the deficiency payment program.
Volatilities of cash and futures prices were substantially higher under their "no government
program" scenario suggesting that loan rates and target prices reduce price variability.
This study builds on previous studies by explicitly considering post-harvest
marketing strategies for wheat producers of varying degrees of risk aversion. These
strategies include the use of futures and options contracts with several strike prices to
allow for more strategies. An example is a bull spread strategy that uses two calls with the
same expiration date but with different exercise prices (Kolb). A call with an exercise
price below the futures price is purchased while a call with an exercise price above the
futures price is sold. This strategy anticipates an increase in prices but reduces risk of
price declines by using calls. Another example is a bear spread strategy that uses two caUs
with the same characteristics as those described in the bull spread strategy, but the call
with the lower exercise price is sold and the call with the higher exercise price is
purchased. This strategy anticipates a decrease in futures prices but reduces the risk of an
increase in prices by using calls.
14
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Optimal strategies are found using integer solutions for number of futures and
options contracts, and sensitivity analysis is performed on interest rates. Commission
costs and maintenance fees are included in the model, and optimal strategies are selected
by maximizing expected utility. Finally, the deficiency payment program is correctly
modeled as an average option.
The above considerations make the model representative of the marketing
decisions faced by wheat producers at harvest. By making the choices realistic (e.g.
integer contract solutions, several strike prices for each contract, and availability of
multiple contracts) the inter-relations ofthe various marke6ng tools can be studied as they
relate to actual practices. Furthermore, the consideration of storage, purchase and sale of
futures and options contracts, different risk aversion levels, and participation in the
government program reveals the dynamic effect of changes in current government
programs and other determining forces (e.g. changing interest rates or crop yield). Finally,
by correctly modeling the deficiency payment program, results are more realistic (i.e.
correctly modeling the time value of the deficiency p·ayment and its effect on the optimal
marketing strategy).
15
CBAPTERn
THE THEORETICAL MODEL
This section introduces a theoretical model for producer revenue from post-harvest
marketing strategies, basing the model on those introduced by Wolf and by Adam, Garcia,
and Hauser.
Wolf proposed a model of a hedger who maximizes expected utility by choosing
simultaneous futures and options positions in an optimal hedge framework. Adam,
Garcia, and Hauser modified Wolfs model to represent the marketing decision faced by
livestock producers. Due to the additional marketing strategy alternatives considered
here, modifications must be made. Thus, the model used is similar to the one Adam,
Garcia, and Hauser used except it allows for storage and participation in the government
deficiency payment program, Producer marketing revenue is represented by a one-period
model that begins on June 20 (the typical harvest completion date in central Oklahoma)
and ends on November 30 (the time of year with the highest average cash price; see figure
3). Producer revenue is calculated as:
Producer Revenue = Revenue from cash sale + Deficiency payment + Findley payment +
Net revenue from futures/options transactions - Storage costs - Commission costs.
16
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Revenue is generated by buying or selling futures and options at harvest selling
wheat at harvest or storing until November 30 and then selling, and from government
program payments, if the producer is participating in the program.
Producer revenue can be rewritten in equation fonn as:
R = r «Pel Yp Ah)~) + (1 - ~)«PC] - SCAT) Yp All) + G«DPr + FPr)Y;ldp + ldp}
(1) + L)pp - r PjllNPj + L;[Ci] - r cjJI]NC, + V;-J.lNF - (r tco) abs(NPj)abs(NC,)
- (r tc)abs(NF)
where
R = revenue from marketing activities (in November 30 dollars),
Pel,Pe2 = cash price received at time 1 and 2, respectively,
Yp,Ye = actual and program yield respectively,
P = percent of wheat sold at time I,
"'~ = acres harvested and acres eligible for deficiency payments, respectively,
G = 1 ifparticipating in government program; 0 otherwise,
DPt,FPt= total deficiency and Findley payments, respectively,
Idp = interest earned on the March and December DP's ,
Pjt = put option premium at the jth strike price at time t (t = I, 2),
r = risk-free rate ofretum + unity (r adjusts time 1 premium and commission values
to time 2 tenns),
NPj,NCj> NF= number of puts, calls, and futures contracts (negative values indicate NF
sales),
Cit = call option premium at the ith strike price at time t (t = I, 2),
~ = futures price at time t (t = 1,2),
SC = storage costs per bushel,
tco,tcf =transaction cost for an option (put or call) or futures contract (including initial
margin requirements), and
.6.T = number ofdays grain is stored (163).
Since time 2 prices are not known, producers are assumed to maximize expected
returns by using combinations of positions in the futures and option markets, selling on the
cash market at harvest, storing in time 1 and selling in time 2, and participating in the
deficiency payment program. These positions are based on expectations about ending
price distributions given an initial cash position. The producer's problem is
18
(2)
and
(3)
Max EV(R)
W.r.t. ~. NPj • NC i, NF
S.t. NPj,NCj • and NF are integers
Max !U(R)L 1(R)dR
w.r.t. p, NPl' NC; NF
S.t. NPl' NCi , and NF are integers
--
where V(R) is the producer utility function and L'(R) represents the producer's
assessment of the probability density function of R.
The producer is assumed to have an initial cash position equal to 10,000 bushels of
wheat. At time 1 the producer formulates expectations of cash, futures, and options prices
for time 2 and takes appropriate positions in the futures, and options markets. Also, part
or all of the wheat may be sold in time 1. The producer's subjective expectations enter the
model through the parameters ofL'(R). At time 2 the producer offsets any futures or
options positions taken in period 1 and sells any remaining grain at the prevailing Gulf
price, less transportation costs to central Oklahoma. 7 It is assumed that the producer
makes maintains futures and options positions taken in time 1 until November 30 when the
period ends. 8 This limits the possible combinations of strategies but also reduces the time
needed by the producer to maintain the strategies.
The following assumptions are made in solving the problem:
(a) producer harvests 10,000 bushels ofwheat,
(b) marketing decisions are made on June 20,
(c) no storage losses (no quantity risk),
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-(d) all marketing positions are liquidated on November 3D, with no time value
remaining in options,
(e) futures and options markets are efficient,
(f) u. S. monthly average price returns are distributed lognorrnally,
(g) producer maximizes expected utility,
(h) three different risk aversion levels,
(i) deficiency payment assumptions:,
I. acres harvested = acres eligible for payment (no set aside requirement, flex
requirements are met with other acres, and no optional flex acres are used).
2. actual yield = program yield.
3. average historic marketing weights are used to calculate marketing year and 5-
month average prices.
(j) monthly volatilities and means are calculated over years 1974-1993,
(k) time 1 prices are set at their average over crop years 1974-1993,
(1) producers may buy (sell) 1 or 2 oftbe following: futures contracts, puts at three
different strike prices, and calls at three different strike prices. They can sell 0%,
50%, or 100% oftheir wheat at harvest or November 30. This results in 234,375
possible strategies,
(m) transportation from central Oklahoma to the Gulfport is $O.7S/bu, and
(n) seasonal price and marketing patterns are the same with government programs as
without them.
Given these assumptions, equations (2) and (3) can be rewritten as:
R = r «PCI Yp Ah)P) + (l - PXPc2 - SC ~1) Yp Ah + G(DP, + FP,)Yc AdP + IdP) + LJ
(4) [MAX(xp/ - h , 0) - r P/IJNP/ + L/[M4XU; - xc; , 0) - r cdNC; + U; - J;)NF - r
tc0 abs(NP)abs(NC) - (r tcf)abs(NF)
and
+00- +00 +00 .00
(5) MaxEU(R) = maxJJr·JU(R) L '(PC2, F2 1 USN) S'(USJ •• USM ) dUS/'dUSM> dPC2,dF2
-~ -~ 0 0
where
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-XPj = jth strike price for put options,
XCi = ith strike price for call options,
t~ = 0 ifcall option is not exercised,
p c2 = cash price at time 2,
F2 = futures price at time 2,
USN =U. S. monthly average price for November,
US] = U. S. montWy average price for July,
USM = U. S. monthly average price for May,
L'(Pc2, F21 USN) = joint distribution of cash price and futures price conditional on the
US. monthly average price for November, and
S'(US]' . US~ = joint distribution of0. S. monthly average prices.
Equation 5 reveals that the cash and futures prices are conditional on the U. S.
monthly average price for November. Specifically, a set ofestimated coefficients and a
generated error term are used to predict the Gulf and futures prices using the U. S.
monthly average price for November. It also shows that the 0. S. monthly average price
for November is conditional on the all the previous monthly average prices. Starting in
June, each succeeding 0. S. monthly average price is conditional on all the previous
generated U. S. monthly average prices. This is because the price generating equation
uses the previous U. S. monthly average price along with the historical mean and
volatility ofthe current month to predict the current monthly average price.
Simulation Procedures
Figure 4 on page 22 represents the simulation process used to solve the producer
problem stated in equation 5. The price generator (figure 4, box #2) produces eleven,
U.S. monthly average prices (June - May) using a randomly drawn error term, monthly
means, and monthly volatilities.
Using the generated and initial U. S. monthly average prices, a marketing year and
a 5-month average price is calculated (figure 4, box #5). These prices are used to
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calculate a deficiency and a Findley payment (figure 4, box #8) used in the producer
revenue equation (figure 4, box #10).
Using the generated U.S. monthly average price for November, Gulf and futures
prices on November 30 are predicted (figure 4, box #4). Specifically, estimated
coefficient values (figure 4, box #6) and a generated error term are used to predict these
prices. The generated error term is the product of two components. A Cholesky
decomposition is performed on the regression variance/covariance matrix and serves as
one component (figure 4, box #7). The other component is a randomly drawn error term
(figure 4, box #4). The resulting prices determine the revenue from storage and
futures/options transactions (figure 4, box #10).
Each marketing strategy (figure 4, box #9) is evaluated using the predicted prices
and deficiency payments in the producer revenue equation (figure 4, box #10). These
returns are adjusted for risk using both the mean-variance and the Cox-Rubinstein utility
function (figure 4, box # 11). One completion of this di.agram produces one set of ending
prices (11 U. S. monthly average prices, Gulf price and December Kansas City futures
price on November 30, and the marketing year and 5-month average prices) used to
calculated one possible producer return (R). The boxes in figure 4 not in bold type
represent parameter estimates that do not change as the simulation is repeated. The
portions offigure 4 in bold type are processes that change with each new draw of a
random error term. The simulation process is repeated 2,000 times in order to solve the
producer problem using Monte Carlo integration. The following sections provide a
detailed explanation of the simulation summarized in figure 4.
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I ,
-Estimation Procedures
Monte Carlo integration is used to solve the producer's marketing decision
represented in equation 5. It provides an estimate of the definite integral by randomly
generating a large number of representative values for the variables. An estimate of the
functional value is obtained by taking the simple average of these ending values. This
approach is necessary since predictions ofNovember 30 prices and U.S. monthly prices
are needed on June 20 to evaluate the various marketing strategies.
This technique is numerically efficient, provides standard errors for the estimates
and accommodates complex payoff structures. It can be illustrated using the following
definite integral (Tirupattur and Hauser):
(6) R = JR(y)fly)dy.
o
An estimate ofR can be obtained by drawing randomly a large number of sample
values, Yi and calculating:
(7)
I nR = - LR(yJ
n ;=1
Specifically, an estimate ofR (producer revenue associated with each marketing
strategy) is obtained by generating a large number (2,000) oftime 2 cash, futures, 5-month
average, and marketing year average prices. These prices are then introduced into the
producer revenue equation (4) to generate 2,000 revenues (R values) for each marketing
strategy. Because these prices are predictions, the associated returns must be adjusted for
risk.
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and the Cox-Rubinstein can be written as:
Risk Adjustment
Since expected utility is a measure of well-being that adjusts uncertain returns for
risk and attitude towards risk, some assumptions must be made when applying the results
to real world conditions. As discussed in the literature review, different functional forms
model response to risk differently.
The mean-variance (expected value-variance) approach has been a popular form
due to its ease of interpretation and computational tractability. It is equivalent to expected
utility maximization if profits are normally distributed or utility can be represented by a
quadratic function. However, prices are not lognonnally distributed (see Judge et al.,1980
p.299.) and inclusion ofoptions in the model creates skewed distributions of returns.
Also, a quadratic utility function implies that risk averseness increases as wealth increases,
the opposite ofwhat many people believe to actually exist.
Since there have been recent studies indicating the usefulness of mean-variance as
an approximation of expected utility (Hanson and Ladd; Garcia, Adam, and Hauser), both
the Cox-Rubinstein and mean variance utility functions are used. However, the Cox-
Rubinstein does not require additional assumptions (such as normal distribution of returns)
to satisfy expected utility axioms, making it more realistic (Robison and Barry). The mean
variance can be written as:
(8) EU(R) =R - (q/2)v
2S
where q is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (AP), v is the variance of
the return, q is the level of constant relative risk aversion, and R is the revenue figured in
equation 4. The coefficient d is standardized to the AP coefficients of absolute risk
aversion used in the mean-variance equation, by multiplying each AP coefficient by the
amount ofwealth from selling all the crop at harvest (e.g. d = AP x RO). Following
procedures suggested by Raskin and Cochran, values for the AP coefficients are adapted
from measures used by Adam, Garcia, and Hauser in order to adjust for different units of
measurement. Specifically, three levels ofrisk aversion are considered: low risk aversion
is assumed to be characterized by an Arrow-Pratt (AP) absolute risk aversion parameter of
0.000002~medium risk aversion, AP = 0.0001; high risk aversion, AP = 0.0003.
The Cox-Rubinstein function exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA)
which implies that initial levels of wealth affect risk aversion. Using this utility function,
expected utility for each strategy is calculated by taking the average over the 2,000
possible prices of the utility of producer revenue (R) for each strategy.
Computational Method
A simulation process is used to generate 2,000 producer returns (R) for each of
the marketing strategies. Gauss is the software chosen to complete this simulation, since it
allows for integer solutions to nonlinear optimization problems (Aptech Systems, Inc.).
Specifically, a grid-search technique is used to find the optimal integer solution (the
strategy that maximizes expected utility) by replicating 2,000 different price paths and
(9) EV(R) = (1 / (1 - d))R l-d
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-calculating producer revenue for each strategy at each of the 2,000 prices.
The price generation box in figure 4 represents the generation of U. S. monthly
average prices from July of the current year through June of the following year (11
months). Assuming price returns are distributed lognormally,9 a random sequence of U.S.
monthly average prices is generated by drawing an error term from a standard nonnal
distribution (figure 4 box #1) and introducing it into: (figure 4 box #2)
(10) P, = exp (e,o, + III + JnPt-t)
where
PI = U.S. monthly average price for month t (starting with July),
Pt- l = Previous U. S. monthly average price
el = random error tenn taken from standard normal distribution,
Or = volatility oflog price returns of historical U.S. monthly average prices in month t.
and
Ilr = means of the log price returns ofhistorical U. S. average prices in month 1.
This equation models the generation of prices as a random walk with a drift. Such a
method suggests that the best estimate of tomorrow' s price (PI) is today's price(Pt_l) plus a
random error tenn (eJ. A random walk is one in which future steps or directions cannot
be predicted on the basis of past actions (Malkiel, pg. 24). Applying this to the futures
markets, it means that short-run changes in price cannot be predicted.
U. S. monthly average prices are generated because they are used by the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to calculate deficiency payments. Since this
price is an average of the six major classes of wheat, volatilities and means calculated from
historic U.S. monthly average prices are used to generate U. S. monthly average prices
instead of simulating cash prices for hard red winter wheat (one of the six major classes
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used to calculate the U. S. monthly average prices) and using them as an approximation for
the U.S. monthly average prices.
The price generating process allows for seasonality of prices and stochastic volatilities
by using average monthly means and volatilities to generate each U.S. monthly average
price (e.g. the January historic mean and volatility is used to generate the January price
etc.). Monthly means and volatilities of the price returns are based on historical values
occurring from 1974 - 1993. The formulas used to calculate these values are:
A scenario that considers the effect of no government deficiency payment on post-
harvest marketing strategies requires an increase in volatility measures. Because a higher
volatility causes the mean of a lognormal distribution to be higher (Cox and Rubinstein pg.
t In(.!.i!-)
1 = 1 PiI - 1~t = --.......>----!.-, and
n
1 t [In(.!.!!.-J - Ill] 2
n-l 1=1 Pil-l ,
I . t I [current US Monthly Average price]og price re urn = n ,
Previous US Monthly Average price!
203-4), an adjustment is made to equation 10 following Arias; Naylor; et a1.; and Mapp. It
(13)
(12)
(11)
where
n = number of years in data minus one, due to the lag (19-1),
1 = year (1974 - 93),
t = month (July - June)
III = mean ofthe log price returns for month t , and
or = volatility of returns for month t.
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can be written as:
(14)
This equation allows for increased volatility without increasing the expected value. This is
based on the idea that futures prices do not include a risk premium; therefore, as volatility
increases the expected return should remain the same.
Using the generated u.s. monthly average prices, the marketing year average and 5-
and can be represented as:
example, the marketing year average price can be figured as:
month average prices are calculated (figure 4, box #5). Each monthly average price is
12
MYA = L MP j WT;
j " 1
Expanded quantity purchased during the month
Expanded quantity purchased during the (n) months
=Marketing year average price,
= U. S. monthly price for month i (June through October), and
= Weight i (% of 12-month marketing that took place in month i).
(16)
of each monthly price and monthly weight over the appropriate number of months. For
where n = number of months incorporated into the average (USDA-NAS S, 1974-1994).
that month. The marketing weights are based on 1977/78 to 1993/94 marketing year data
The average price (e.g. marketing year or 5-month) is calculated by summing the product
weighted according to the average amount of marketing that has historically occurred in
(15)
where
MY
:MPi
WT1
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These prices are used to calculate the deficiency and Findley payments (figure 4, box
#8). The following section describes these calculations in detail.
Government Deficiency Payment Program
Wheat deficiency payments are designed to provide an economic "safety net" for
producers who comply with acreage reduction requirements and other provisions of the
annual wheat program. Deficiency payments are made directly to producers when the
marketing year average prices received by farmers for all wheat are below specified target
levels. The government deficiency payment (OP) is computed using current 1994-95
guidelines (USDA-ERS). The DP program uses average acres, yields, and prices to
calculate the amount that participating producers are eligible to receive.
Acreage Calculations
The number of acres eligible for payment is figured from the crop acreage base allotted
to each farm. It is the 5-year moving average ofland planted to a crop plus land
"considered planted" to a crop as established by an office of the USDA. "Considered
planted" land includes acres that are put into an approved conserving use (ACR). These
acres must protect the land from weeds, wind ,and water erosion. The percent of base
acres required to be used for conservational purposes is determined by the stocks to use
ratio. This ratio is a measure of the amount of wheat in storage relative to the amount
used. Ifthis ratio is high (i.e> 40%), set aside requirements (ACR) are increased to
reduce the amount produced the following year. But if it is low, ACR requirements can
be reduced to as low as 0%. The following formula is used as a guideline in determining
ACR rates (USDA-ERS).
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•
-Stocks to Use Ratio
<=40%
>40%
ACR Requirements
0% to 15%
10% to 20%
Flex acres are established at 15% ofthe base acres and are intended to reduce the
amount of government outlays while allowing farmers to have a greater "flexibility" in
what they plant. This flexibility allows market forces to determine what crop is grown.
Under the 1985 fann program, market forces (e.g. prices) had little effect on the quantity
produced, since most productive acres are in the government program. To be eligible for
the deficiency payment, acres must be planted to the crop they were signed in under. In
addition, the '90 fann bill includes an optional flex acreage program which allows up to an
additional 10% of the base acres to be planted to other crop(s) (USDA-ERS).
While ACR, flex, and optional flex acres are "considered planted II when figuring the
base acreage of a farm, they are not included in the acres eligible for deficiency payment.
The formula used to calculate acres eligible for the deficiency payment is
(17)
where
Aq, = acres eligible for deficiency payment,
~ = base acres (acres planted to the program crop + those "considered planted",
a = percent required set aside acres,
y = percent flex acres, and
J.. = percent optional flex acres.
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•
(18)
The formula used to calculate acres harvested is
Ab(1 - a - y - A) If flex and/or optional flex acres are
Ah = used for a crop other than wheat
Ab(1 - a) otherwise.
Acres harvested and acres eligible for deficiency payment are different if flex or optional
flex acres are planted to a crop other than wheat.
For example, consider a farm with a wheat base acreage of 100 acres, an ACR
requirement of 7.5%, 15 flex acres used for soybeans, and an additional 10 optional flex
acres of soybeans. The total acres harvested and eligible for deficiency payment are
An = 100(1 - .075 - .15 - .10)
= 100(1 - .675)
= 67.5 acres
and
Aep = 100(1 - .075 -.15 - .10)
= 100(.675)
= 67.5 acres.
If the 15 flex acres are planted to wheat and the optional flex acres not used, the
total acres harvested and eligible for deficiency payment are
An = 100(1 - .075)
= 100(92.5)
=92.5 acres
and
~ = 100(1 - .075 - .15 - 0)
= 100(.775)
= 77.5 acres.
To get the number of bushels eligible for the deficiency payment, the program yield
(official averages were frozen in 1985) is multiplied by the eligible acres. Similarly,
number of bushels harvested is actual yield multiplied by harvested acres.
32
Price Calculations
The deficiency payment program uses a U.S. 5-month average price to calculate the
December payment and a U.S. marketing year average price to calculate the July payment.
These averages are based on monthly prices of the 5 major varieties of wheat (durum
wheat, hard red spring wheat, hard red winter, soft red winter, and white). 10
To obtain the monthly average prices, the National Agricultural Statistics Service
(NASS) surveys the 21 major wheat producing states in the U.S. which account for 90%
or more of the total wheat production. These surveys are sent to bonded grain purchasers
in each state who have agreed to participate and have been informed on how to calculate
data requirements.
Each state is divided into strata (areas of similar geographical size) with samples
taken from each according to the total wheat capacity. For example, all the wheat
purchasers in large-capacity strata might be surveyed while as few as one in five wheat
purchasers in small-capacity strata might receive surveys. Surveyed participants are asked
to report the total quantity ofwheat purchased from fanners and the total dollars paid
during a calendar month. Bushels purchased and dollars paid for each strata are summed
up and multiplied by the reciprocal of the sampling fraction to get an expanded strata total.
If one in five purchasers are surveyed, the results are multiplied by five to estimate the
total for the entire strata. Expanded strata numbers are then summed to get a state
quantity purchased and dollars paid. The state monthly average price is then figured by
dividing expanded dollars paid by the expanded quantity purchased.
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(19) expanded dol/ars paid for the entire month
expanded quantity purchased for the entire month
The U.S. monthly average price is figured by dividing the total expanded dollars paid
for wheat in the 21 surveyed states by the total expanded number of bushels purchased for
the 21 surveyed states. It can be figured as:
(20) expanded dollars paid for the U.S. for each month
expanded quantity soid for the U.s. for each month
The 5-month average and marketing year average prices (respectively) are calculated
using the same procedures:
each month's percent of total marketings (i.e. the quantity purchased) for both the 5 and
dollars paid for wheat. Instead they publish monthly prices for each of the 12 months and
(21)
and
(22)
totai U.S., survey-expanded dollars paid for wheat during 5 month period
total U.S., survey-expanded quantities purchased of wheat during 5 month period
total U.S., survey-expanded dollars paid for wheat during 12 month period
total U.S., survey-expanded quantity purchased during 12 month period
However, NASS does not publish data on either total quantities purchased or tota.l
12 month periods. These weights are figured as follows:
(23) Expanded quantity purchased during the monthExpanded quantity purchased during the (n) months
where n = number ofmonths incorporated into the average.
The average prices can then be calculated by summing the product of each month.ly
price and monthly weight. For example, the 5-month average price can be figured as:
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(24)
~
L MP, WT,
i ~ 1
where
MPi =U.S. monthly price for month i (June through October) and
WTi =Weight i (% of 5-month marketings that took place in month i).
Loan Rates
A loan rate is the rate ($/bu) at which the government will provide a loan to fanners
enabling them to hold their crops for sale at some later date. This loan allows producers
to take advantage of increases in prices (reacquiring their crop by paying the amount of
the loan plus storage costs) or protect against decreases in price (by forfeiting the grain
and keeping the loan rate). It is effective for nine months and is nonrecourse, meaning the
crop serves to pay back the loan even if current market price is less than the loan rate plus
storage costs. Although the Secretary of Agriculture can adjust the basic loan rate
according to stocks-to-use ratio (in order to maintain competitiveness), there are
guidelines that establish the minimum and the estimate. The basic loan rate is based on a
5-year moving average (including the projected average of the current year) ofmarketing
year average prices. This average excludes the highest and lowest prices of the five years
and then is multiplied by 85 percent to arrive at the projected loan rate at the time of
program sign-up. The minimum for the current year's loan rate is 95 percent of the
previous year's rate after all adjustments are made. Table 1 summarizes the guidelines
used to make adjustments to the basic loan rate using 1991 numbers as an example.
Deficiency Payment Rate Calculation
Producers participating in the government program have the opportunity to receive a
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Table 1. Projecting Announced Loan Rate
Basic Loan Rate
(projected)
$2. 52/bu
Relevant Adjustment
Adjust down 10%, if
Adjust down 5%, if
Adjust down 0%, if
Adjusted Basic Loan Rate
(ABLR)
If 80% ofmoving average (MA) is
less than the minimum (MN), use
ABLR (from above).
If not, use higher of the minimum
(MN) and ABLR (from above).
Additional adjustment to maintain
competitiveness
Announced Loan Rate
(projected)
Stocks-to-
use ratio
above 30%
15 to 30%
less than 15%
$2.37 (MA)
$2.44 (MN)
up to 10%
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-.25/bu
nla
nla
$2.27/bu
$2.27/bu (ABLR)
nla
$2.04/bu
$2.04/bu
deficiency payment at sign up in March. The March deficiency payment rate is calculated
as:
(25)
where
TP
MY~
DPmar = .5 Max(TP - MYA p' 0)
= Target price (established with passage offann bill) and
= Projected marketing year average price (determined by the USDA).
Since producers receive this payment in March, it can earn interest from March of
the current year through July of the following year. This is because any advance payment
received in March of the current year is not subject to repayment until July of the
following year. Producers may have to pay back all or part of this advance payment if it
exceeds the higher of the December or July deficiency payment calculation.
An additional deficiency payment calculation in December uses the U. S. 5-month
average price plus SO. 10 to estimate the payment. Since the 5-month and marketing year
average prices are weighted by the quantity sold, months with heavy marketings influence
the average more than those with tighter marketings. Based on marketing weights from
77/78 to 93/94, on average 58% ofthe year's marketings occur in these five months.
Thus, prices must decline substantially over the remaining seven months for the marketing
year average price to be less than the 5-month average. By only paying 50% of the
projected March calculation and adding SO.1 0 to the 5-month average price, precautions
are taken to reduce the chance of overpaying producers (which leads to a payback
situation).
The December deficiency payment rate can be figured as: (USDA, pg. 2-43)
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(26) DPDec = Max(TP - Max(S-mo avg. + .10, BLR), 0).
Each time a payment calculation is made, all prior payments are subtracted (e.g. DPMor is
subtracted from DPoc,,)
Findley payments or "emergency compensation" payments are made when the
marketing year average price is below the basic loan rate. These payments are made to
compensate producers for the loss ofprice support caused by the lowering of the loan rate
from the basic loan level. In addition, it allows flexibility in setting the price "floor" in an
attempt to allow market forces to detennine price. This floor occurs when market prices
fall below the basic loan rate causing producers to put grain in the loan program at the
higher price. This program allows the wheat to stay on the market while producers
receive a payment in the amount that the loan rate was adjusted. However, Findley
payments have not been made for wheat since the 1987 program. The December Findley
payment rate can be figured as: (USD~ pg. 2-43)
(27) FPDec = Max .75(BLR - Max(ALR, MYA p), 0).
Since the projected marketing year average price is used, only 75% of any positive
amount is actually paid in December. Similar to the March payment, the December
payment has the potential to earn interest from the time this payment is received (usually
in January or February) through July of the following year.
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The final deficiency payment rate calculation takes place in July of the following year
using the actual marketing year average price. It can be calculated using: (USDA, pg. 2-
44)
(28) DPJuI = Max(TP - Max(MYA, BLR), 0).
However, program guidelines state that the deficiency payment in December is the
guaranteed minimum payment. Stated another way, the producer receives the maximum
of the December and the July deficiency payment.
The final Findley payment rate calculation also takes place in July when the
marketing year average price is known. It is calculated as: (USDA, pg. 2-44)
(29) FPJul = Max(BLR - Max(ALR, MYA), 0).
A payback situation exists if the March deficiency payment is greater than the
maximum of the December and the July payments (DPMar > Max CDPDec , DPJuI». This
occurs in years when the projected marketing year average price is considerably different
than the actual marketing year average price.
The same situation exists with the Findley payment; since the payment in December
is based on the projected MY price, the final calculation in July could require a payback
(FPJuI < FPDcc)· The payback calculation can be summarized as: (Consolidated Farm
Services Agency)
(29) PYBK = Max (DPMar - Max (DPDe.c' DPJul), 0) + Max (FPDec - FPJuJ> 0).
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Total Payment Calculation
The total payment is made up of the deficiency payment and the Findley payment.
The deficiency payment is the product of the eligible production (payment acres x
program yield) and the deficiency payment rate (as discussed above). This payment is
subject to a $50,000 limit for each person enrolled in the govenunent program. The
Findley payment is the product of the Findley payment rate (as discussed above) and the
eligible production (payment acres x program yield); it is not subject to any maximum
payment. Eligible production does not depend on actual yield but instead on the program
yield (established on a county basis and periodically adjusted) or a proven yield (based on
5 years of past yields).
The total payment is figured as:
(31)
Coefficient Estimation
Cash and futures prices at time 2 (November 30) are generated using coefficient
estimates and a generated error term (figure 5, box #4). The coefficient estimates come
from a regression that uses the generated u.s. mon.thly average price for November and
other relevant variables to predict November 30 Gulf and futures prices (figure 5, box #6).
The initial model used the following terms:
(32)
where
GPN
[ GPN 1= [r (USMON, USMOJ, GPJ)] + EDKCNj If (USMON, GPJ, DKCJ)
= Gulfprice on November 30,
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The June prices were included in both equations to capture the most current
The regression results of the initial model indicated that the coefficients of USMON
the second equation. Due to the presence of autocorrelation in the initial modet, the lags
I,.
I
I
•I
f,
i
= price of the December Kansas City futures contract on November 30,
= the generated U. S. monthly average price for November,
= U.S. monthly average price for June,
= Gulf price on June 20,
= price of the December Kansas City futures contract on June 20, and
= regression error term.
appropriate model is a fonn of a partial adjustment model.
of the Gulfprice, U.S. monthly average price, and the December Kansas City futures price
and relating the U.S. monthly average price to the December Kansas City futures price in
were added to the independent variables in the regression. This suggests that the
infonnation relating the U.S. monthly average price to the Gulfprice in the first equation
in both equations were not significantly different than 1 (p-value in the GPN equation =
.58S~ p-value in the DKCN equation = .206). By restricting the coefficients on the
DKCN
USMON
USMOJ
GPI
DKCI
E
USMON in each equation to equal 1 and subtracting them from the previous dependant
variables, the Gulf and futures basis become the new dependent variables. Although not
all of the independent variables are significant (see table 2), other regressions omitting
nonsignificant variables led to significant variables becoming less significant. The final
regression model can be expressed as:
(32)
[
GBASNl
KC1l4SNr
[
.26618 - .32973 LUSMON + .20771 LAGPN - .12229 USMOJ + .28786 GPJ j. E
-.10213 + .22391 LUSMON - .12180 LADKCN - .080841 GPJ - .049737 DKCJ
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Table 2. SUR Prediction of tbe Gulfffj.S. Monthly Average Price Basis and DKCBasis on November 30.
Independent Variables
Dep. Variable
GBASN
LUSMON LAGPN LDKCN USMOJ DKCJ GPJ Intercept MeanMSquared
Error
Equation
R2
Unrestricted
Coefficients
-.32976·
(.1178t
.2077\
(.1052)
N/A -.\2229
(.1031 )
N/A .28786·
(.1031)
.26618
(.2588)
.16456 .54
P-values of
Coefficients
~ KCBASN
w
Unrestricted
Coefficients
.013
.22391
(.1451)
.067
N/A
N/A
-.1218
(.\3144)
.225
N/A
N/A
-.08084
(.09878)
.014
-.04973
(.0784)
-.10213
(.2295)
.02081 .37
P-values of
Coefficients .144 N/A .379 N/A .426 .535
I Estimated standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses.
• Indicate significance at the 5% level.
Note: The system ofequations uses 20 Observations and has an R2 = .66,'
GBASN
LUSMON
LAGPN
USMOJ
GPJ
KCBASN
LDKCN
DKCJ
= Gulf price at time 2 (expiration of the December option) minus the U.S. monthly average price for November
= Previous year's US. monthly average price for November
= Previous year's average gulf price for November
= u.s. monthly average price for June
= Gulf price on June 20
= U.S. monthly average price for Nov. minus the Dec. Kansas City contract at time 2 (USMON-DKCN)
= Previous years December Kansas City futures contract at time 2
= Price of the December Kansas City futures contract on June 20
~.....----- ---~-'"';;--- '"f,....... ..1'f....1,~~-;'!-_,.~'T_I__:::J.__
The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach in SHAZAM was used to
-
where
GBASN
KCBASN
LUSMON
LAGPN
LADKCN
E
= November 30 Gulf price - US. monthly average price for November;
(GPN = GBASN + USMON),
= US. monthly average price for November - November 30 price of the
December Kansas City futures contract; (DKCN = USMON - KCBASN),
= previous year's U S. monthly average price,
= previous year's Gulf price on November 30,
= previous year's average price of the December Kansas City futures
contract for November, and
= regression error term.
estimate this system ofequations. SUR provides more efficient coefficient estimates, since
it allows the error structure from one equation to affect estimates of the related equation
(futures and Gulfprices are related through a basis).
Generated Error Term
Since this system ofequations is related through a typical basis, the simulation error
term incorporates this information. Figure 5 is a detailed representation of the simulation
described in the previous sections. An error term is generated as the product of two
components (figure 5, box #4). To account for the relationship between cash and futures
prices, a Cholesky decomposition is performed on the system variance/covariance matrix
saved from the last iteration of the regression estimation (figure 5, box #6). The
Cholesky decomposition of a matrix yields a matrix that if multiplied by the transpose of
itself, yields the original matrix (figure 5, box #7). The result of this process serves as one
component ofthe generated error term. It can be written as:
(34)
where
Q = LL I
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Using the variance lcovariance matrix. saved from the regression results, equation
n = system variance/covariance matrix. and
L = product ofCholesky decomposition
(34) can be rewritten as:
-.1183221] .
.0400563
o ][.1425140
.0400563 0
Q = [ .1425140
-.1183221
(35)
-
The other component of the generated error term is a 2x1 matrix of randomly
generated error terms (using a standard normal distribution),
(36)
Combining these components, the generated error term for the prediction of the
Gulf and futures prices can be represented as:
(37)
.1425140
-.1183221
o
.04005628 ]~:]
where VI and v2 are the simulation error term, the second matrix is the 2x2 product of the
Cholesky decomposition of the system variance/covariance matrix, and e l and ~ are
randomly drawn error terms. The equation used for the prediction of the GPN and DKCN
can be written as: (figure 5, box 4)
(38)
[
GBASNl
KCBASNr
[
.26618 - .32973 LUSMON + .20771 LAGPN - .12229 USMOJ + .28786 GPJ 1+ rV1 ]
-.10213 + .22391 LUSMON - .12180 LADKCN - .080841 GPJ - .049737 DKCJ h
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-Strategy Evaluation
Using the calculated deficiency and Findley payments (figure 5, box #8) and the
calculated November 30 prices (figure 5 box #4), the producer revenue (figure 5 box #10)
can be calculated for each marketing strategy (figure 5, box #9). After one completion of
the simulation (represented by figure 5), each strategy (consisting of different combinations
of cash sales, storage, futures, puts, and calls) is evaluated at the generated prices. The
resulting producer revenues (one for each strategy) are adjusted for three different levels of
risk aversion (figure 5, box 11) using the both the mean-variance and the Cox-Rubinstein
utility functions (equations 8 and 9). At the end ofone simulation process, each strategy
has three associated risk adjusted returns. The Monte Carlo integration evaluates each of
the 234,375 strategies over 2,000 sets of prices producing a risk-adjusted return for each
strategy for each risk aversion level.
Model Specification
The simulation is based on prices occurring over 1974 - 1993, except that the
futures price is constrained to be unbiased (e.g. markets are assumed to be efficient). In
other words, it is assumed that the June 20 December futures price is the best available
predictor of the November 30 December futures price. This means that although on any
given year the November 30 price could be higher or lower than the June 20 price, the
average November 30 futures price is the same as the average June 20 price. Similarly, it is
assumed that the options premiums on June 20 equal their expected value. 11
Also, it is assumed that transaction costs are S80/contract for options and
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-$70/contract for futures, and that the margin requirement for futures contracts is $800 per
contract. These prices are based on quotes from the following commodity brokers: Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc., Merryl Lynch.. Smyth Barney & Harris, and Cowless Sabol &
Company Inc. Commission costs varied from $36 per round tum to $80 per round tum for
futures contracts and from $36 per round tum to $90 per round tum for options contracts.
Volume discounts do exist (one broker required 25 contracts for a discount) but exact
amounts are offered only after the transactions have been made.
Most brokerages require an initial deposit of around $5,000 to open an account.
After margin requirements are taken out of this deposit, the balance is typically deposited in
a money market account that accrues interest. Ifmargin calls are made, the account is
deducted for the amount and if positions become more valuable, the account is credited. A
u. S. treasury bill can also be deposited with the broker to cover potential margin calls;
however, the customer's account is only credited with 90% of the face value. Also, the
initial margin must be made in cash when pledging a T-bilt. Initial margin requirements
ranged from $650 to $1,200 for futures contracts. Options that are purchased do not
require a margin requirement since the premium paid is the maximum amount that can be
lost. Margin requirements for writing options were not available due to the many factors
that determine them. However, as an approximation, the Federal Reserve has established
the following minimums for writing a call option on stock.
(a) In-the-money calls: 100% of the proceeds from the sale of the option + 20% of
the value of the underlying stock position(s),
(b) Out-of-the-money calls: 100% of the proceeds from the sale of the option +
20% of the value of the underlying stock position(s), or
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(c) Out-of-the-money calls: 100% of the proceeds from the sale of the options +
10% ofthe value of the underlying stock position(s); whichever is less.
The producer is assumed to have harvested 10,000 bushels ofwheat (equivalent to
333% acres based on an average yield of30 bulacre). At harvest, the producer may buy
(sell) one or two SOOO-bushel futures contracts, and one or two SOOO-bushel put and/or call
contracts at each of three strike prices. The producer may sell all, one-half, or none of the
crop at harvest, and any grain produced but not sold at harvest is sold on November 30 at
the prevailing Gulfprice less transportation costs ofSO.75/bu.
For each strategy, expected utility is calculated, and for each level of risk aversion
the strategy with highest expected utility is selected. Expected utility measures are
converted into risk-adjusted dollars by expressing them as certainty equivalents. The
certainty equivalent measure for the Cox-Rubinstein utility function is
..
(39) c.£. = [(1 - d) . U]1I(1 -d)
The certainty equivalents for the mean-variance utility function are equal to the utility
calculations due to the form of the equation.
Thus, economic significance is used rather than statistical significance. The model is
optimized for four scenarios, all ofwhich set time 1 (harvest-time) Gulf cash, Kansas City
futures, and U.S. monthly average prices at their average June 20 price over the last 20
years. Since harvest-time prices are set at historical averages, the model is not appropriate
for recommending particular strategies in a particular year. Rather, the model is designed to
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-assess the average effect that reducing or eliminating government deficiency payments
might have on producers· marketing strategies.
In the first scenario, target price is set at its current level ($4.00Ibu.). In a second
scenario, the target price is reduced to the average of previous June monthly average U.S.
prices, reflecting current farm policy proposals to reduce target prices. 12 Both of these
assume the producer participates in the government deficiency payment program.
In the third and fourth scenarios it is assumed that no deficiency payment program
exist. Ifthe current program encourages producers to produce more than they otherwise
would, resulting in higher stocks, price volatility is probably lower than it would be without
a program. To allow for the possibility that prices would become more volatile without a
government program, it is assumed in a third scenario that prices are 50 percent more
volatile and in a fourth scenario that prices are 100 percent more volatile than under the
current program.
Other evidence suggests that price volatility might increase by more than 50 percent
in the absence of government support prices. A graph provided by Crain and Lee suggests
that prices were two to three times more volatile under programs which resulted in a greater
market orientation than under other program regimes. In the fourth scenario, it is assumed
that prices are twice as volatile as assumed in the first two scenarios. The following is a
summary of each scenario and all the assumptions (listed on pages 19 and 20) made in
solving each one.
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-1
Participation in
Scenario Government
Program,
Target Price =
$4.00
Assumptions a - m
(pgs. 19 &20)
2
Participation in
Government
Program,
Target Price =
$3.17
a - m
3
No
Government
Program
(50% higher
volatility)
a-h
]- n
4
No
Government
Program
(100% higher
volatility)
a-h
) - n
It is assumed that commercial storage costs 2¢lbu.lmonth (see Anderson and
Noyes). In addition, a producer incurs an opportunity cost offoregone interest by not
selling the wheat. The initial interest rate is set at 10%, the average interest rate charged
by the Bank for Cooperatives over the period 1974-1993 . Sensitivity of the results to
alternate interest rates is discussed later.
Since no set-aside has been required for the last two years, the percent of base
acres required to be set aside is set at zero. Also, it is assumed that program yield equals
actual yield and that the predicted marketing year average price is correct (which implies
that a payback situation never occurs).
Description ofData
The analysis in this thesis is a simulation of the marketing strategies that a
producer maximizing a particular utility function would choose given a particular set of
information. The empirical data required to conduct such a simulation are those used to
estimate realistic values for the parameters in the simulation. Gulf price data are used as
the cash prices in this estimation and are taken from the November 30 and June 20 Gulf
delivery prices for U.S. hard-red winter wheat. 13 Although other parameters (e.g. yield
and beginning and ending dates of the period) are based on central Oklahoma values, the
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-change in Gulf prices from time 1 to time 2 is very similar to the change in local cash
prices over this time. This change in price (from time 1 to time 2), and not the price level,
is what detennines strategy selection.
The futures prices used are the November 30 and the June 20 closing prices for
the December contract on the Kansas City Board ofTrade. IfNovember 30 fell on a
weekend or holiday the preceding trading day's closing price is used. Both the gulf and
the futures prices are taken from data sets provided by Technical Tools.
U.S. monthly average prices, 5-month marketing weights, and marketing year
average price marketing weights are taken from various issues (1974-1994) of the
Agricultural Prices Summary published by the Economic Research Services.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Results indicate that participation in the government deficiency payment program
does not necessarily reduce hedging. Although the deficiency payment helps reduce
revenue risk, marketing strategies are available that can reduce risk nearly as well as the
deficiency payment program can. The biggest loss to producers from reducing deficiency
payments is lost revenue and inter-year risk reduction.
With interest rates at 10% (the average over this period oftime), the accrued
interest revenue from selting the crop at harvest is 13.8¢/bu., netting a November 30 price
of$3.21/bu (not counting the deficiency payment). For the optimal strategy to involve
storage, the risk adjusted gain of that strategy (from June 20 until November 30) must be
greater than this amount. This is because selling at harvest eliminates all price risk.
Tables 3 - 11 present results of four scenarios for three different levels of risk
aversion using a mean-variance utility function. Table 3 indicates that producers with low
risk aversion choose the same strategy in each scenario, storing wheat at harvest and
selling it on November 30; no futures or options are used. The risk adjusted returns (not
including the deficiency payment) are greater than $3.21/bu, making storage optimal.
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-Table 3: Optimal Post-Harvest Marketing Strategies: Low Risk AversioD; 10%
Interest Rate; Mean-Variance Utility Function.
Gov't Program; Gov't Program;
Target Price = Target Price =
$4.00Ibu. $3. 171bu.
No Gov't
Program (50%
higher volatility)
No Gov't
Program (100%
higher volatility)
$32,809 $32,229 $32,229
($3.28/bu) ($3.22/bu) ($3.22/bu)
$2,988 $5,045 $6,767
$32,800 $32,203 $32,184
$32,240 $32,203 $32,184
($3.224) ($3.220) ($3.218)
$3 $40 S59
$553 SO SO
Expected Return
Standard
Deviation
Risk-Adjusted
Return
Risk-Adj. Return
wlo Income of
Def Pymt.(S/bu)
Risk-reducing
Benefit Lost
Expected
Deficiency and
Findley Payments
Interest on Def
and Findley
Payments
Percent Sold at
Harvest
Futures Contract
Put (SO. 10 out-
of-the-money)
Put (at-the-
money)
Put (S.10 in-the-
money)
Call (SO. 10 in-
the-money)
S40,143
($4.01/bu)
S2,492
$40,137
$32,243
($3.224)
$7,707
S187
o
S7
o
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o
$0
o
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These results indicate that on average the market price increases by 5.04% from
June 20 to November 30 while the opportunity cost of capital (with interest rates of 10%)
over this period is 4.490.10. Therefore, there is little difference (.55%) in the rate of return
between selling at harvest and the optimal strategy of storing until November 30. The
cash price used here is the Gulf price less SO.75/bu. transportation costs, approximating
central Oklahoma prices.
As figure 6 shows, the payoff of the portfolio with a target price of S4.00 (storing
the crop at harvest and receiving a deficiency payment) resembles that of a call option with
a strike price of $4.00/bu. The main difference is that while the intrinsic value of a call
option can never be worth less than SO.OO/bu., the portfolio pictured here can never be
worth less than $4.00Ibu. If the marketing year average (MY) price decreases to
$3.00/bu., the cash position decreases to $3.00/bu., but the deficiency payment increases
to $l.OOlbu. (4.00 - 3.00) making the portfolio worth $4.00/bu. However, if the MY
price increases above $4.OOlbu, the cash position value increases by the same amount
while the deficiency payment becomes worthless, allowing dollar for dollar gains when
prices rise above $4.00Ibu.
This payoff becomes worth even more as volatility increases. Essentially, a call
option gives its owner most of the benefits of rising prices and protects the owner from
suffering the full cost of a drop in prices. Thus, a call option offers insurance against
falling prices and holds out the promise of high profits from rising prices. The riskier the
value of the underlying futures contract, the greater the chance of an extreme price
movement. Ifprices fall dramatically, the insurance feature of the call option comes into
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Figure 6. Portfolio Value with Crop Sold on November 30.
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-play limiting the call holders loss. However, ifprices increase dramatically, the call owner
participates fully in the price increase. The protection against large losses, coupled with
participation in large gains, makes call options more valuable when the underlying stock is
risky (i.e. prices become more volatile).
Table 3 also shows that the standard deviation of returns, or risk, increases as
deficiency payments are reduced or eliminated. The increased risk comes primarily from
lowering or removing the "floor" on prices. With a $4.00 target price and a strategy of
storing until November 30, returns could range from $3.22/bu. to S4.98/bu., depending on
the year. With a $3.17 target price and the same strategy, that range is from $2,37/bu. to
$4.61/bu. Thus, reducing the target price from $4.00 to $3.17 shifts the minimum price
received downward by SO.85/bu. but shifts the maximum price received downward by only
$0.37/bu. The range widens to $1.76/bu. to $5.34/bu. under the scenario with 50 percent
higher price volatility, and to a range of Sl.44/bu. to $6. 17/bu. under the scenario with
100 percent higher price volatility. However, because the producer in table 3 cares little
about risk, the effect on risk of reducing the deficiency payment is not enough to change
the producer's optimal strategy.
The fifth line of each table records for each scenario the risk-reduction benefit lost
by the producer when moving from the current program to that scenario. For example,
the risk-adjusted return in the scenario with a target price of$4.00 is $40,137, while the
risk-adjusted return with a $3.17 target price is $32,800. Subtracting the income effect of
the deficiency payment from the risk-adjusted return gives the risk-reducing benefit of the
payment. This is accomplished by taking the risk-adjusted return minus the deficiency
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payment and interest. These results are presented in the fourth line of each table.
The risk-reducing effect of each scenario (without the income effect of the
deficiency payment) is compared to the $4.00 target price scenario and the results are
shown in the fifth line ofeach table. Reducing the target price to $3. 17, costs a producer
with a low level of risk aversion and a cost of capital of 10%, $3.00 in risk protection. In
the no-govemrnent-program scenario with 50% more volatile prices, an additional $40 of
risk protection is lost, and in the 100% more volatile scenario a total of $59 of risk
protection is lost. This small loss in risk-reduction benefit from reducing or eliminating
the deficiency payment indicates that the main benefit of the deficiency payment is as an
income supplement. These results support the idea that deficiency payments reduce risk
and that use of futures and options could increase as target prices are reduced.
However, these results are sensitive to other factors. Table 4 indicates that a
producer with medium risk aversion under the $4.00 target price scenario chooses a
strategy of selling 50 percent of the wheat at harvest and storing the remaining 50 percent
for sale in November. The risk-adjusted return of this strategy is greater than storing the
entire crop ($39,940 compared to $39,832) or selling the entire crop at harvest ($39,940
compared to $39,775). However, the risk-adjusted return after subtracting the income
effect of the deficiency payment is less than the return of selling at harvest, suggesting that
the riskiness of each strategy is important to the producer's choice. The standard
deviation of selling the entire crop at harvest (2,092) or storing the crop (2,492) is greater
than the standard deviation of only selling half the crop at harvest (1,535). This is because
of the offsetting effects of the crop in storage and the deficiency payment to changes in
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-Table 4: Optimal Post-Harvest Marketing Strategies: Medium Risk Aversion; 10%
Interest Rate; Mean-Variance Utility Function.
Goy't Program; GOy't Program;
Target Price = Target Price =
$4.00Ibu. S3.17/bu.
No GOy't
Program (50%
higher Yolatility)
No GOy't
Program (100%
higher yolatility)
$32,684 $32,079 $32,079
($3. 27/bu) ($3.21/bu) ($3.21/bu)
$890 SO $0
$32,644 $32,079 S32,079
$32,084 $32,079 $32,079
($3.208) (S3.208) (S3.208)
$38 -$33 -S33
$553 SO SO
Expected Return
Standard
Deviation
Risk-adjusted
Return
Risk-Adj. Return
wlo Income of
Def Pyrnt.(S/bu)
Risk-reducing
Benefit Losta
Expected
Deficiency and
Findley Payments
Interest on Def
and Findley
Payments
Percent Sold at
Harvest
Futures Contract
$40,058
($4.01/bu)
S1,535
$39,940
32,046
(S3.205)
S7,707
S187
50
$7
50
$0
100
SO
100
Put ($0.10 out-
of-the-money)
Put (at-the-
money)
Put (S. 10 in-the-
money)
Call ($0.10 in- sell 1 contract
the-money)
"Negative nwnbers indicate that risk-reduction benefits are gained, not lost, when deficiency payment is reduced.
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price. The stored crop protects the value of the deficiency payment from increasing
prices, and the deficiency payment protects the value of the stored crop from decreasing
pnces.
In this scenario, selling the wheat would eliminate all price risk, but the producer
would be subject to the risk that the deficiency payment would decrease if prices increase.
Storing a portion of the wheat helps offset that risk. Thus, storing wheat is used to hedge
the deficiency payment. Storage is used as a hedge instead of buying a futures contract,
buying a call, or selling a put, because it is cheaper. Since the cash price increases at
roughly the cost of storage (with interest rates at 10%), the expected return from storing
wheat is approximately equal to storage and interest costs. Because time 1 futures price is
an unbiased predictor of the time 2 futures price, the expected return from a futures or
options position is a loss equal to the transaction costs. Thus, storing a portion of the
wheat protects the deficiency payment from increasing prices thereby decreasing the
standard deviations of returns at near-zero cost.
Although the deficiency payment is hedged, it appears that less than the entire
quantity is hedged, since the deficiency payment is for 10,000 bu. and a futures contract is
written on 5,000 bushels. However, since on average 58% of the MY price is detennined
in the first 5 months of the marketing year, this position is nearly fully-hedged. This can
be illustrated by considering the following example. If the cash and futures prices increase
by $.20/bu. from June through November, the value of the futures contract increases by
$.20 for the 5,000 bushels, which translates into a $.10 increase for the 10,000 bushels.
Meanwhile, the deficiency payment has decreased by approximately $.10Ibu. since only
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58% of the price movement that takes place in the first 5 months affects the realized
marketing year average price. The resulting payoff is plotted in figure 7. The graph of
50% sold at harvest shows that the gain from decreasing prices in the deficiency payment
is offset by the loss from the grain in storage. As with any hedged position, ifprices
move favorably the gain is forfeited.
Table 4 also shows that if the target price is reduced to $3.17, the producer sells
half of the crop at harvest and sells one in-the-money call. The crop in storage hedges the
deficiency payment against increases in prices; however, since the target price is reduced
to $3.17, the floor on prices is reduced by $0.83. By selling an in-the-money call (strike
price = $3.51), the producer receives a premium of $0.19/bu. which has the effect of
raising the target price to $3.36 when the futures price is $3.51 or below. When futures
prices are above $3.51 /bu., the option will be exercised decreasing the target price to
$3.17 as the futures price approaches $3.61 and above. Since option markets are efficient,
the initial premium equals the average of the distribution of ending intrinsic values.
Therefore, futures and options are bought and sold to reduce risk while sacrificing some
amount of expected return. According to the producer's level of risk aversion, a tradeoff
of reduced risk for expected return is made such that the optimal strategy is the one with
the greatest risk-adjusted return. In this case, selling 50% ofthe crop at harvest and an in-
the-money call provides the optimal risk/return tradeoff given a target price of $3.17. A
strategy that would accomplish the same result would be to hedge the deficiency payment
by storing a smaller portion (e.g. 25%) of the crop until November 30. With such a
strategy, a call would not have to be sold to protect the crop in storage.
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Figure 7. Portfolio Value: Crop Sold at Harvest for $3.00/bu.
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-In the no-government program scenarios, the optimal strategy is to sell the entire
crop at harvest. Without the added risk of the deficiency payment, the cenain return of
selling at harvest ($30,079) is greater than the risk-adjusted return of storing until
November 30 ($30,806 with 50% greater volatility and $29,939 with 100% greater
volatility). 14
The results with no government program apply to current legislation that replaces
the deficiency payment with a payment that is not determined by market prices or that
does not require set-aside acres. Such a payment would provide a certain revenue
(eliminating the need to hedge the uncertain MY price), resulting in an optimal strategy
determined by the physical cost of storage and opportunity cost of capital. Since on
average the market price increases only slightly more than the average opportunity cost of
capital and storage, futures and options positions are not part of the optimal strategy. For
futures and options to be used, there would have to be a larger return to storage. This
could result from a lower than average opportunity cost ofcapital or a cost of storage less
than 2¢/bu./month. Then, as risk aversion increased, producers could use futures or
options to reduce the risk of storage while still capturing the higher return of storage.
Table 5 indicates that the optimal strategy for producers with high risk aversion is
to sell half of their crop at harvest if the target price is $4.00. The risk-adjusted returns of
this strategy, ignoring the deficiency payment, is less than the certain return of selling at
harvest. However, the risk from the uncertain deficiency payment actually causes the risk
reduction of this scenario to be less than the scenarios without the government program.
Therefore, the optimal strategy involves storage because it hedges the deficiency payment
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Table 5: Optimal Post-Harvest Marketing Strategies: High Risk Aversion; 10%
Interest Rate; Mean-Variance Utility Function.
Gov't Program; Gov't Program; No Gov't No Gov t
Target Price = Target Price = Program (50% Program (100%
$4.00Ibu. $3.17/bu. higher volatility) higher volatility)
Expected $40,058 $32,577 $32,079 $32,079
Revenue ($4.01/bu) ($3.23/bu) ($3.21/bu) ($3.21/bu)
Standard $1,535 $607 SO SO
Deviation
Risk-adjusted $39,705 $32,521 $32,079 $32,079
Return (S/bu)
Risk-Adj. Return $31,811 $31,961 $32,079 $32,079
wlo Income of ($3.181) ($3.196) ($3.208) ($3.208)
Def Pymt.($/bu)
Risk-reducing -$150 -$268 -$268
Benefit Lost'
Expected Def $7,707 $553 $0 $0
and Findley
Payments
Interest on Def. $187 S7 $0 SO
and Findley
Payments
Percent Sold at 50 100 100 100
Harvest
Futures Contract
Put (SO.10 out-of-
the-money) sell 1 contract
Put (at-the-
money)
Put (S. 10 in-the-
money)
Call (SO.10 in-the-
money)
"Negative numbers indicate that risk-reduction benefits are gained, not lost, when deficiency payment is reduced.
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-against increasing prices while increasing in expected value at roughly the cost of storage
and interest.
When the target price is reduced to $3. 17, the optimal strategy is to sell the entire
crop at harvest and buy an out-of-the money put. Even though the target price is reduced,
the deficiency payment still increases risk since there is no offsetting cash position. A put
is sold to hedge the deficiency payment against increasing prices, reducing the standard
deviation of returns to $607. Ifthe optimization algorithm had permitted it, a strategy
with similar risk-adjusted returns for this scenario would have been to sell 75% ofthe crop
at harvest, with no futures or options. The 25% of the crop in storage would hedge the
deficiency payment against increases in price, while the expected gain in cash price from
time 1 to time 2 would offset the cost of the protection (storage and interest).
In the no-government-prograrn scenarios, the optimal strategy is to sell the entire
crop at harvest. This locks in a price, avoids storage cost and eams interest over the time
period, but passes up the opportunity to gain from price increases. There is no deficiency
payment, so no hedging positions are needed to offset this risk.
Thus, subtracting the income-increasing features of the deficiency payment
program and looking only at the risk-reduction benefit, producers' risk-adjusted returns
change little as target prices are reduced or eliminated. Hedging and other cash market
strategies provide adequate risk management. Furthennore, for producers with a low or
medium risk aversion level over all government program scenarios, the loss in risk-
adjusted returns from choosing the sub-optimal strategy of selling wheat at harvest and
doing nothing else ranges between one and four cents per busheL Some producers may be
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-willing to give up that relatively small amount in order to avoid having to allocate
additional effort to marketing strategies rather than to production activities.
The above results assume commercial storage costs of2.0¢/bu./month, and a, cost
of capital of 10%. Ten percent represents the average rate charged by the bank of
cooperatives over the time period considered and probably represents the lowest rate that
producers who borrow from commercial banks received over this period.
Additional results show that using a higher cost of capital would change the
optimal strategies. With an average cost ofcapital of 11 %, for example, the opportunity
cost of storage increases to 15.5¢, requiring a November 30 price of$3.22/bu, to break
even. Since this price is approximately equal to the expected November 30 price, the
optimal strategy for producers who face an average cost ofcapital >= 11% would be to
sell at harvest (after the expected return is discounted for risk, it would be less than the
opportunity cost ofcapital). Also, if storage costs increase by 1¢/bu./month with interest
rates at 10%, the optimal strategies are the same as increasing the interest rates to 11 %
while storage costs are 2 centslbu./month.
Tables 6-8 show the optimal strategies for the three different levels of risk aversion
considering an average interest rate of 12%. Table 6 shows that the higher storage costs
(from the increased interest rates) makes it optimal to sell at harvest. No market-based
strategies are used for producers with low levels of risk aversion. This indicates that
interest rates determine whether to sell the crop at harvest or store until November 30 and
risk aversion determines whether the deficiency payment should be hedged.
The results in table 7 indicate that the optimal strategy for all scenarios includes
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-Table 6: Optimal Post-Harvest Marketing Strategies: Low Risk Avenion; Interest
Rate = 12%; Mean-Variance Utility Function.
Expected
Revenue
Standard
Deviation
Gov't Program; Gov't Program; No Gov't No Gov't
Target Price = Target Price = Program (50% Program (100%
S4.00/bu. S3.l7/bu. higher volatility) higher volatility)
$40,818 $33,771 $32,759 $32,759
($4.08/bu) ($3.38/bu) ($3.28) ($3.28/bu)
$2,609 $1,054 $0 SO
Risk-Adjusted
Return (S/bu)
Risk-Adj. Return
wlo Income of
Def Pymt.($/bu)
Risk-Reducing
Benefit lost
Deficiency
Payment
Percent Sold at
Harvest
Futures Contract
Put ($.10 out-of-
the-money)
Put (at-the-
money)
Put ($.10 in-the-
money)
Call ($.10 in-the-
money)
$40,804
$33,579
($3.358)
$7,224
100
$33,769 $32,759 $32,759
$33,293 S32,759 $32,759
($3.333) ($3.276) ($3.276)
$287 $820 $820
$476 0 a
100 100 100
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Table 7: Optimal Post-Harvest Marketing Strategies: Medium Risk Avenioo;
Interest Rate = 12%; Meao-Variance Utility Function.
Gov't Program~ Gov't Program~ No Gov't No Gov't
Target Price = Target Price = Program (50% Program (100%
$4.00Ibu. S3.l7/bu. higher volatility) higher volatility)
Expected $40,748 $33,248 $32,759 $32,759
Revenue ($4.07/bu) (S3.32/bu) ($3.28/bu) ($3.28/bu)
Standard $1,405 $681 SO SO
Deviation
Risk-Adjusted S40,451 S33,178 S32,759 $32,759
Return ($lbu)
Risk-Adj. Return $33,227 $32,702 S32,759 $32,759
w/o Income of (S3.332) (S3.270) (S3.276) (S3.276)
Def Pymt.($lbu)
Risk-Reducing S48 S467 $467
Benefit Lost
Deficiency S7,224 S476 0 0
Payment
Percent Sold at 100 100 100 100
Harvest
Futures Contract buy 1 contract
Put (S.10 out-of-
the-money)
Put (at-the-
money)
Put (S.10 in-the-
money)
Call (S.lO in-the-
money)
sell 1 contract
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selling wheat at harvest, since the cost of storage is greater than the return. Due to the
increased level of risk aversion, the' optimal marketing strategies include the use offutures
or options to hedge the deficiency payment. These strategies are the same as those that
are optimal with 8% interest rates and a high level of risk aversion. A futures contract is
used to hedge the deficiency payment with a target price of$4.00, while a put is sold to
hedge the deficiency payment with a target price of $3.17. The only difference is that with
a medium level of risk aversion, an "at-the-money" put is sold instead of an "out-of-the-
money" put in the high risk scenario. The "at-the-money" put is riskier since there is a
greater chance that it will be exercised than the "out-of-the-money" put. This greater
amount ofrisk leads to a higher premium, which would be more important to an individual
who discounts returns less for risk. With no government program, the deficiency payment
is no longer risky, eliminating the need for futures or options.
Table 8 indicates that a producer with high risk aversion sells wheat at harvest
under all four scenarios for the same reason as discussed in Table 7. However, the
optimal use of futures and options changes to selling an "in-the-money" put and buying an
"in-the-money" call for a target price of$4.00 and selling an ttout-of-the-money" put for a
target price of $3.17. The portfolio payoff under a $4.00 target price (selling at harvest
and buying a call) resembles that ofa put; however, the minimum portfolio value is
increased by selling the put. The minimum portfolio payoff under a $3.17 target price is
also increased by selling a put, but this also limits the gain in the deficiency payment from
decreasing prices. The higher level of risk aversion changed the strike price of the put
from "at-the-money" to "out-of-the-money". This option is less risky since prices have to
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Table 8: Optimal Post-Harvest Marketing Strategies: High Risk Aversion; Interest
Rate = 12%; Mean-Variance Utility Function.
Gov't Program; Gov't Program; No Gov't No Gov't
Target Price = Target Price = Program (50% Program (100%
$4.00/bu. $3.17/bu. higher volatility) higher volatility)
Expected $40,650 $33,236 $32,759 $32,759
Revenue ($4. 821bu) ($4.07/bu) ($3.28Ibu) (S3.28/bu)
Standard Sl,337 S653 SO SO
Deviation
Risk-Adjusted S37,965 S32,596 $32,759 S32,759
Return ($/bu)
Risk-Adj. Return S30,741 S32,120 $32,759 $32,759
wlo Income of ($3.074) ($3.212) (S3.276) ($32,759)
Def Pymt.(Slbu)
Risk-Reducing -$1,378 -$2,018 -$2,018
Benefit Lost·
Deficiency S7,224 S476
°
0
Payment
Percent Sold at 100 100 100 100
Harvest
Futures Contract
Put (S.l 0 out-of- sell 1 contract
the-money)
Put (at-the-
money)
Put (S.l 0 in-the- sell 1 contract
money)
Call (S. 10 in-the- buy 1 contract
money)
"Negative numbers indicate that risk-reduction benefits are gained, not lost, when deficiency payment
is reduced.
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go down $.10 more before it becomes a liability.
Ifproducers faced a lower than average cost of capital over this time period, the
optimal strategies would also be different than those under the 10% scenario. Table 9
shows that the optimal strategy for producers with a low level ofrisk aversion and an
opportunity cost of capital of 8% is to store the crop until November 30. Since returns
are discounted little for risk and the opportunity cost of storage is reduced, the risk·
adjusted gain from storing is greater than the certain return from selling at harvest.
Table 10 presents the results for producers with a medium level of risk aversion;
the optimal strategy with a target price of$4.00 is to store the entire crop until November
30. The increased risk aversion decreases the risk-adjusted return but not by enough to
make the use offutures or options optimal. If the target price is reduced to $3.17, the
optimal strategy is to store all of the crop and sell one futures contract and one in-the-
money call. The futures contract and call provide price protection against decreasing
prices, indicating that a reduction in target price leads to increased hedging to reduce the
risk. In the 50% and 100% higher volatility scenarios, the optimal strategy is to sell all the
crop at harvest, which eliminates risk but forgoes potential gain in price after harvest. The
increased risk aversion discounts the risk-adjusted returns of storage to less than the
certain return from selling at harvest.
The optimal strategy for producers with a high level of risk aversion (Table 11)
involves selling all the wheat at harvest, under all four scenarios. This locks in a price,
avoids storage cost and eams interest over the time period, but passes up the opportunity
to gain from price increases. However, the uncertain deficiency payment, which is no
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Table 9: Optimal Post-Harvest Marketing Strategies: Low Risk Aversion; Interest
Rate = 8%; Mean-Variance Utility Function.
Expected
Revenue
Standard
Deviation
Gov't Program~ Gov't Program; No Gov't No Gov't
Target Price = Target Price = Program (50% Program (100%
$4.00/bu. S3.17/bu. higher volatility) higher volatility)
$40,228 $32,964 $32,442 $32,442
($4.02/bu) ($3.30/bu) ($3.24/bu) ($3.24/bu)
$2,223 $2,946 $3,370 $4,986
Risk-Adjusted
Return ($/bu)
Risk-Adj. Return
wlo Income of
Def Pymt.($/bu)
Risk-Reducing
Benefit Lost
Expected
Deficiency and
Findley Payments
Percent Sold at
Harvest
Futures Contract
Put ($.10 out-of-
the-money)
Put (at-the-
money)
Put ($.10 in-the-
money)
Call ($.10 in-the-
money)
$40,220
$32,996
($3.300)
$7,224
o
$32,951
$32,475
($3.248)
$521
$476
o
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$32,442
$32,442
($3.244)
$554
o
o
$32,442
$32,442
($3.244)
$554
o
o
Table 10: Optimal Post-Harvest Markefng Strategies: Medium Risk Aversion;
Interest Rate = 8%; Mean-Variance Utility Function.
Gov't Program; Gov't Program; No Gov't No Govermnent
Target Price = Target Price = Program (50% Program (100%
$4.00/bu. $3.17/bu. higher volatility) higher volatility)
Expected $40,228 $32,845 $32,302 $32,073
Revenue ($4.02/bu) ($3.28/bu) ($3.23/bu) ($3.21/bu)
Standard $2,224 $1,251 $798 $0
Deviation
Risk-Adjusted $39,486 $32,610 $32,207 $32,073
Return ($/bu)
Risk-Adj. Return $32,262 $32,134 $32,207 $32,073
wlo Income of ($3.226) ($3.213) ($3.221) ($3.207)
Def Pymt.($/bu)
Risk-Reducing $127 $55 $55
Benefit lost
Deficiency $7,224 $476 0 0
Payment
Percent Sold at 0 0 0 100
Harvest
Futures Contract sell 1 contract sell 2 contracts
Put ($.10 out-of-
the-money)
Put (at-the-
money)
Put ($.10 in-the-
money)
Call ($. 10 in-the- sell 1 contract
money)
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Table 11: Optimal Post-Harvest Marketing Strategies: High Risk Avenion; Interest
Rate = 8%; Mean-Variance Utility Function.
Gov't Program; Gov't Program; No Gov't No Gov't
Target Price = Target Price = Program (50% Program (100%
$4.00/bu. $3. 17/bu. higher volatility) higher volatility)
Expected $39,788 $32,528 $32,073 $32,073
Revenue ($4. 73/bu) ($3.25/bu) ($3.21Ibu) ($3.21Ibu)
Standard $1,346 $634 $0 SO
Deviation
Risk-Adjusted $37,070 $31,924 $32,073 $32,073
Return ($/bu)
Risk-Adj. Return $29,846 $31,448 $32,073 $32,073
wlo Income of ($2.985) ($3.145) ($3.207) ($3.207)
Def Pymt.($lbu)
Risk-Reducing -$1,720 -$2,502 -$2,502
Benefit Lost'
Deficiency $7,224 $476 0 0
Payment
Percent Sold at 100 100 100 100
Harvest
Futures Contract buy 1 contract
Put ($.10 out-of- sell 1 contract
the-money)
Put (at-the-
money)
Put ($.10 in-the-
money)
Call ($.10 in-the-
money)
'Negative numbers indicate that risk-reduction benefits are gained, not lost, when deficienc)' payment
is reduced.
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longer offset by a cash position, increases risk. With a target price of$4.00, a futures
contract is bought to provide protection against increasing prices. Under a reduced target
price, the expected deficiency payment is smaller ($0.046/bu.) and the producer can
effectively hedge this smaller amount by selling an out-of-the-money put.
Under the current program, the amount of any deficiency payment is not known at
harvest when the wheat is sold, and is thus risky; the risk averse producer finds that
reducing the government deficiency payment reduces risk. In fact, after netting out the
income-enhancing aspect of the deficiency payment, the highly risk averse producer,
across all levels of opportunity costs, actually gains risk-reduction benefit when the target
price is reduced from $4.00 to $3.17.
The actual strategies chosen are sensitive to the assumptions about interest rate,
storage costs, utility specification, and other parameters of the model. But the expected
values of the top strategies are similar enough that even when the optimal strategies may
differ, the risk-adjusted return does not change substantially. As producers' opportunity
cost of capital and/or level of risk aversion increase, they find it optimal to sell at harvest
to eliminate the price risk associated with storage. This leaves the deficiency payment
vulnerable to increasing prices; so, it is hedged using storage, futures or options.
(Additional results, not reported here, using the Cox-Rubinstein utility function support
this finding. The exact combination of hedging instruments used was different using the
Cox-Rubinstein utility function, but the overall results from this function were the same.)
This sensitivity of choice of marketing strategy to varied model specifications
suggests that the simulation reflects a market that is reasonably consistent with the law of
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one price. As a consequence, producers are unlikely to find marketing strategies that
perfonn substantially better on average than selling wheat at harvest, unless they have
extra, year-specific information.
To summarize, after subtracting the income-increasing features of the deficiency
payment program and looking only at the risk-reduction benefit, producers with low levels
of risk aversion lose small amounts of risk-adjusted revenue when target prices are
reduced or eliminated. Producers with medium or high levels of risk aversion may gain or
lose risk-reduction benefit, depending on the scenario. A far bigger loss to producers is
the revenue-increasing aspects of the deficiency payment program, although this loss
would be smaller than reported here if participating in the government program required a
set-aside of eligible acres.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
The deficiency payment performs two primary functions when included in a
producer's post-harvest marketing strategy: a) risk reduction and b) income suppon.
When combined with storage of the crop, the deficiency payment establishes a payoff
similar to a call option. If prices decrease, the declining value of the cash position is offset
by the increase in value of the deficiency payment. When prices increase, the deficiency
payment decreases while the value of the cash position increases dollar for dollar with
market prices. Risk associated with storing wheat is reduced since the deficiency payment
protects against decreasing prices. As target price is reduced or the deficiency payment
program is eliminated the entire stored crop is no longer protected.
However, since the value of the deficiency payment is not known until the end of
the marketing year, it actually increases the level of risk for producers with medium or
high levels of risk aversion. This is because the cash price increases on average from
harvest to November 30 by roughly the cost of storage and capital. At higher risk
aversion levels, the optimal strategy is to sell all wheat at harvest because it provides a
certain return nearly equal to the return from storage (not discounted for risk). If
producers sell all their wheat at harvest, the deficiency payment is no longer protected
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against increasing prices. These producers find it optimal to reduce the risk of the
deficiency payment by storing part of their crop, buying a futures contract or 8 call, or
selling a put. As target prices are reduced or payments not connected to the market price
are made, producers will store less and/or use fewer futures and options contracts. They
no longer need to hedge the uncertainty of the deficiency payment.
However, storage costs and cost of capital affect this relationship. If a producer
faces a cost of capital less than the market average (10% was the average cost of capital
over this time period) or a cost of storage less than 2¢/bu.lmo., there is more incentive to
store. With a cost of capital 2% less than the average and for higher levels of risk
aversion, the optimal strategies under the deficiency payment scenarios involve storage
while the optimal strategies in the higher volatility scenarios still involve selling the crop at
harvest. With the lower opportunity cost of capital, the risk-adjusted return from storage
is enough greater than the return from selling at harvest that these producers increase their
use of futures and options to provide the stored crop with price protection that would
otherwise be provided by the deficiency payment. A similar effect is observed when
storage cost is decreased.
With a cost of capital greater than the market average, the expected return from
storing becomes less than the associated cost. For example, with a cost of capital 2%
above the average, the optimal strategy for allleveJs of risk aversion is to sell at harvest.
The higher the expected deficiency payment value and the higher the producer's level of
risk aversion, the more likely the producer will hedge the deficiency payment. Reducing
the target price decreases the expected value of the deficiency payment and its associated
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risk, causing risk averse producers to decrease use of futures and options to hedge the
deficiency payment. Less risk averse producers do not hedge the deficiency payment, due
to the potential gain if prices decrease.
The risk-reducing portion of the deficiency payment can almost always be replaced
with futures and/or options, or by selling at harvest. This is due to the similarities between
the payoffofthe deficiency payment and a put option (which can also be emulated using
other combinations e.g. selling a futures contract and buying a call option). When the
optimal marketing strategy includes selling at harvest, the unprotected deficiency payment
actually increases the risk of the portfolio even when compared to the "no-government-
program" scenarios.
This leads to the other main function of the deficiency payment - income support.
From the producer's perspective, this is the greatest loss from reducing or eliminating
target prices. The target price encourages production to be greater than quantity
demanded in years of low prices (cash price below target price). The market price for the
resulting amount ofgrain is determined by the market demand curve. The difference
between the resulting market price and the target price is made up by the government in
the form ofdeficiency payments. Therefore, the market determines price while the
program payment is an additional income determined by the difference between the
resulting market-detennined price and the target price. The deficiency payment varies as
prices vary, making the deficiency payment more ofan intra-year revenue assurance
program than an intra-year risk reduction tool. Since the target price does not vary from
year to year, the deficiency payment provides an inter-year risk reduction not available in
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futures and options markets. These markets do not offer a long-tenn contract that would
provide a guaranteed price over the period of several years.
Although there are costs associated with participating in the government program
(e.g. acreage set aside requirements and other compliance restrictions), the program
provides a guaranteed minimum price at a relatively low cost to the producer. This can be
observed by looking at the expected revenue of marketing strategies consisting only of
participating in the government program compared to strategies using options and/or
futures. The expected revenue from participating in the government program is greater
than the expected revenue of using market strategies by at least the amount of the
deficiency payment. This is because the government is covering the "premium" of the
deficiency payment program while producers have to pay the initial premium to get the
same benefit in the futures or options market.
To summarize: for a producer with low risk aversion at 8%, 10%, and 12%
interest rates, reducing the target price or eliminating the govenunent deficiency payment
program does not affect the optimal post-harvest wheat marketing strategy. For a
producer with a medium level of risk aversion and an opportunity cost of capital of 10%
or 12%, the optimal strategy involves selling at harvest and hedging the deficiency
payment by storing part of the crop or selling a put option. Reducing the target price or
eliminating the government program reduces or eliminates the uncertain deficiency
payment, causing these producers to decrease their use of futures and options. With a
lower opportunity cost of capital (8%), the increased return from storage causes a
producer to store the entire crop. To make up for the reduced target price, risk-reduction
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for the crop in storage is provided by selling a futures contract and a call option. In this
case, reducing or eliminating the deficiency payment leads to increased use of futures and
options.
For a producer with a high level of risk aversion and an opportunity cost of capital
of8%, 10%, or 12%, the optimal strategy includes selling at harvest. Since the uncertain
deficiency payment is risky, reducing or eliminating this payment decreases or eliminates
the need to protect it with storage, futures, or options.
Thus, while some producers will find it advantageous to increase their use of
futures and options if target prices and government price supports are reduced, others may
not. Some likely will reduce risk by selling at harvest instead of storing for later sale,
particularly if they face relatively high capital or storage costs.
These results are similar to previous findings concerning marketing strategies in
the presence of deficiency payments. The desirability of selling the crop at harvest in the
presence of high opportunity costs of capital and/or high levels of risk aversion are the
same results that Anderson and Adam found in their study concerning wheat marketing.
However, by explicitly considering the time value of the deficiency payment, it was found
that the deficiency payment actually increases the level of risk for these producers, causing
them to use storage, futures, or options to reduce this risk.
Similarly, Heifner et al. had stated that intra-year income stability could be
provided by market-based strategies. This coincides with the findings here that with a
high opportunity cost of capital and/or high levels of risk aversion, the deficiency payment
actually increases risk over the no-government-program scenarios that use only market-
80
based strategies. However, Heifner et ai. noted that market-based strategies could not
replace the inter-year stability provided by the deficiency payment program. This study
has examined post-harvest marketing strategies within a marketing year. It has not
considered the effects on year-to-year variation in prices, and the associated risk in long-
tenn investment decisions, of reducing or eliminating target prices.
Results in this study differ somewhat from the findings ofTurvey and Baker who
looked at marketing strategies under different government programs for corn and soybean
producers. They found that the deficiency payment program reduced hedging by corn
producers and that the loan rate reduced hedging by soybean producers. However, due to
the differences in returns to storage, length of time being considered, patterns of
seasonality, and modeling of the deficiency payment program, results are not directly
comparable. By not considering the time value of the deficiency payment, the need for
producers with a high opportunity cost of capital to hedge the deficiency payment was
ignored in that study.
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Endnotes
1. Contracts are sold in 5,000 bushel increments causing producers with production not
divisible by 5,000 to either leave a portion of production unhedged or to be in a
speculating position with more hedged than actually produced. Also, since not all months
have a corresponding futures contract, larger basis risk can result ifa more distant month
must be used.
2. It is based on a five-year average of either a proven farm-yield or a county yield.
3. There are advance payments made in March and December. Ifa market option were
used payment could not be received until July; thus the early payments can earn interest.
4. The deficiency payment is based on a 5-year average yield; therefore, current yields do
not influence the current deficiency payment nor do they influence the value of a
purchased put option.
5. Unlike futures contracts that specify the number of bushels, the deficiency payment
covers the bushels produced on the base acres. But since the yield and number of acres
are predetermined, the deficiency payment is based on a fixed number of bushels,.
6. Section 1742 ofthe Food Security Act of 1985 called for the USDA to study the
manner in which fanners might use futures and options markets, the extent of the price
stability and income protection that producers might expect to receive from such
participation, and the Federal budgetary impact of such participation.
7. Although Oklahoma prices are typically less than Gulf prices, there will not be any
difference in the optimal marketing strategy as long as local basis is constant. The main
component of a local basis is transportation cost and it remains relatively constant
especially over the duration of the model (5 months).
8. It is recognized that the December option expires before this date. However, changing
the ending date of the model does not significantly affect the results.
9. Although some research suggests that prices are not distributed lognonnally,
lognonnality is assumed here for convenience.
10. This changed in 1996 to 6 major classes of wheat. White wheat was divided into two
categories: hard white wheat and soft white wheat (USDA-FGIS)
11. Empirically, this is accomplished by setting the June 20 futures price equal to the
mean of the distribution ofNovember 30 futures prices, and by setting initial options
premiums equal to their computed value over the period of simulation. This method of
premium valuation is similar to stock option pricing models that consider a range of
ending prices when valuing the option. Thus, the premium includes an implicit measure of
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the time value associated with the option.
However, the data indicate that on average the futures price rose 3¢ per bushel from
June 20 to November 30. In some years the price dropped, and in some years the price
rose, but ifa producer had purchased a futures contract on June 20 and sold it on
November 30 every year from 1974 to 1993, the average profit would have been 3¢ per
bushel. Since there is no assurance that this will continue, and because even if it did
continue there would be some years when such a strategy would lose money, this study
does not recommend such a risky strategy. However, ifa producer believes that futures
prices will rise foUowing harvest, a less risky strategy is to buy call options at harvest. For
the initial cost of the premium, the producer can profit if prices rise, but will not lose any
additional money if prices drop. This strategy would be considered speculation, not
hedging, by the Internal Revenue Service.
12. This reduces the intrinsic value of the deficiency payment "option" and increases its
time value, since it is nearly "at-the-money".
13. For the years when November 30 or June 20 fell on a weekend or holiday, the last
trading day before November 30 or June 20 was used.
14. These values are calculated using table 1 values for expected return and standard
deviation for the strategy of storing until November. For 50% higher volatility, CE =
32,229 - (.0001/2) x (5,045)2 = 30,806, and CE = 32,229 - (.0001/2) x (6,767i =
29,939.
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